When “Normal Healing” Delays Discovery of Medical Malpractice

A patient leaves surgery expecting some pain, weakness, swelling, or limited function. The surgeon says the procedure went well. At the next appointment the patient still has symptoms, but is told that recovery takes time. Physical therapy produces some improvement. Months pass.

At what point is that patient supposed to conclude that the surgery itself may have been negligently performed?

That question sits at the center of a new California decision that should interest malpractice lawyers well beyond California. In Godshall v. Peterson, the California Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for an orthopedic surgeon in a case involving an allegedly unsuccessful carpal tunnel release. The court concluded that “triable issues of material fact remain as to the date that Godshall’s injury manifested.” Godshall v. Peterson, No. D086572, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2026). The distinction sounds technical. In practice it can decide whether a malpractice case ever reaches a jury.

The facts: improvement, reassurance, and a ligament that was never released

Cecilia Godshall underwent right carpal tunnel surgery in January 2017. Her work required substantial typing. After the operation she continued to report symptoms, including weakness and discomfort. But the postoperative picture was not one of uninterrupted decline. Therapy records documented improvement. By June she reportedly had no pain or paresthesia, functional range of motion and strength, and only minimal functional limitations. She returned to full duty, although typing restrictions were imposed. Her surgeon also repeatedly reassured her that her symptoms were normal and that the operation had succeeded. Id. at 2, 4, 10, 12.

Years later the picture changed. In 2021 worsening symptoms led another physician to order imaging. The imaging indicated that the transverse carpal ligament that supposedly had been released remained intact. Godshall ultimately underwent revision surgery. She later alleged that the original operation had not fully released the ligament. Id. at 5, 6, 10.

The trial court viewed the postoperative symptoms in 2017 as enough to start California’s limitations period. The Court of Appeal disagreed that the issue could be resolved that cleanly on summary judgment. The appellate court emphasized the latent nature of the alleged surgical failure, the improvement reflected in therapy records, Godshall’s attribution of some symptoms to her typing intensive work, and Peterson’s assurances that her pain was “normal and that the surgery had been successful.” Id. at 10, 12. That combination left room for a jury to decide when appreciable injury actually manifested.

Two clocks run at once under California law

California makes this issue particularly important because its medical malpractice statute contains two separate timing rules. An action generally must be commenced within three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.5. California courts have described these as separate limitations periods that a plaintiff must satisfy. Trantafello v. Med. Ctr. of Tarzana, 182 Cal. App. 3d 315, 318 (1986).

The three year inquiry therefore is not always as simple as identifying the date of the medical procedure. Under California law the relevant injury requires appreciable harm. In Godshall the Court of Appeal rejected the view that the date of the allegedly negligent operation necessarily resolved when injury occurred. The alleged failure had a latent component, involving incomplete release and later ligament regrowth or continued impingement, and the evidence did not establish as a matter of law when that condition produced sufficiently appreciable harm. Godshall, slip op. at 9, 10, 12.

The separate discovery inquiry asks what the patient knew or reasonably should have known. California’s general discovery rule is not especially forgiving once actual suspicion exists. The California Supreme Court has held that limitations begin when a plaintiff suspects or should suspect that an injury resulted from wrongdoing. A plaintiff who has reached that point cannot simply wait for definitive proof. As the court put it, “she cannot wait for the facts to find her.” Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1111 (1988).

That makes Godshall important, but it also keeps the decision from becoming a blank check for delayed filing. Persistent symptoms and suspicion of negligent treatment are not the same thing. A patient can know her hand hurts without knowing that the operation failed. She can experience weakness while reasonably believing that weakness is part of rehabilitation. She can notice improvement in one symptom while another persists. The significance of those facts depends heavily on what treating professionals were saying at the same time. Godshall, slip op. at 10, 12.

Do not cite Godshall as a national rule

The precise statute varies from state to state, sometimes dramatically. Some jurisdictions employ discovery rules. Some place much greater weight on the date of treatment. Others combine discovery provisions with statutes of repose that impose an outside deadline regardless of later discovery. Washington, for example, generally measures a health care claim using either three years from the act or omission or one year from reasonable discovery that the injury was caused by the act or omission, whichever expires later, subject to an eight year outside limitation and specified exceptions. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.350.

So Godshall should not be cited outside California as though it supplies a national accrual rule. It does not. What travels well is the factual reasoning.

Other courts have seen the same fact pattern

In Bohus v. Beloff the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, considered a patient who continued experiencing significant foot pain following surgery while her physician repeatedly attributed the symptoms to the normal healing process. The court recognized that physician assurances that “lull a patient into a false sense of security” can matter to tolling and reasonable diligence under Pennsylvania law. It concluded that the jury could find the patient reasonably relied on those assurances, particularly where other physicians initially reinforced the original prognosis. Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 925, 926 (3d Cir. 1991).

A recent Rhode Island case presents an even closer parallel. In Madison v. Bradley a patient continued to experience problems after hip surgery. The treating physician continued seeing him, offered alternative explanations for his symptoms, and postoperative records indicated that the patient was reassured that “everything was normal and that he was progressing well.” A later bone scan disclosed the problem underlying the malpractice allegation. The court concluded that the discovery rule preserved the claim because, under the circumstances, the patient could reasonably have relied on the continuing explanations he received. Madison v. Bradley, slip op. at 10, 12, 13 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2024). Rhode Island’s Supreme Court has framed its discovery inquiry around when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the wrongful act underlying the lawsuit. Bustamante v. Oshiro, 64 A.3d 1200, 1204 (R.I. 2013).

These cases do not create one national rule. They reveal one recurring evidentiary problem. Recovery from medical treatment is rarely binary. Pain after surgery can mean negligent injury, but it can also mean ordinary healing, expected inflammation, scar formation, recurrence of the underlying condition, overuse, rehabilitation, or something unrelated to the procedure. A limitations argument that simply points to the first postoperative complaint can therefore miss the real question: what did the patient reasonably understand that complaint to mean?

The postoperative chart is the evidence

For plaintiff counsel the operative report is only the beginning. Every follow up visit should be obtained. So should physical therapy notes, occupational therapy records, work restrictions, telephone encounters, portal messages, imaging reports, referral records, and documentation from subsequent physicians. Those records may establish that symptoms improved, that a provider attributed continuing problems to normal recovery, or that the first objective indication of surgical failure appeared much later. Godshall, slip op. at 4, 5, 12.

The patient’s own words matter just as much. Defense counsel should look for the moment reassurance stopped being reassuring. Did the patient tell a spouse that the surgeon had made a mistake? Did she seek another physician specifically because she believed the operation failed? Did she request the operative report, challenge the surgeon’s explanation, or tell another provider that something had been done incorrectly? Under a discovery rule like California’s, evidence of actual suspicion can be far more important than the date on which a later physician finally confirmed the precise technical error. Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1110, 1111.

The same principle cuts against an overly aggressive defense motion. Evidence that symptoms existed is not necessarily evidence that the patient knew what they signified. In Godshall the therapy records and the surgeon’s reassurances complicated that inference. In Bohus additional physicians initially confirmed the treating physician’s explanation. In Madison continued treatment and alternative explanations affected what a reasonable patient would have understood. Accrual cases are often won in the space between the symptom and its explanation.

Build a separate accrual chronology

Before pleading delayed discovery or moving for summary judgment on limitations, build an accrual chronology that is separate from the medical chronology already prepared for liability. For every relevant encounter, record:

  • the date of the encounter and the symptom reported
  • the objective finding, if any
  • what the provider said the symptom meant
  • what the patient said she believed
  • what treatment was recommended
  • whether the condition improved or worsened
  • what event first supplied objective evidence that the prior care may have failed

Then identify the earliest date on which the law of the forum could reasonably charge the patient with both the required injury and the required knowledge or suspicion.

For plaintiff counsel this exercise should happen before the complaint is filed. Obtain the complete postoperative record and preserve the exact reassurance language wherever possible. A note stating that the patient is healing normally can be more important to an accrual dispute than the original surgical report. But counsel should still file conservatively. Godshall reversed summary judgment. It did not announce that physician reassurance indefinitely suspends a limitations period, and it did not eliminate a patient’s obligation to investigate once circumstances reasonably create suspicion.

For defense counsel the same chronology should be built before asserting limitations as a dispositive defense. Identify the earliest evidence showing that the patient connected the persistent symptoms to the procedure rather than merely experiencing them. Patient messages, second opinion records, deposition testimony, requests for records, and statements expressing distrust of the original provider may supply the link that postoperative symptoms alone do not.

Symptoms need context

The practical lesson from Godshall is not that reassurance always delays a malpractice claim. It is that symptoms need context. A patient can hurt after surgery without yet having reason to believe malpractice occurred. When the treating physician says the symptoms reflect normal healing, the rehabilitation record shows improvement, and the actual surgical failure remains medically hidden, a court may be reluctant to decide accrual from the calendar alone. Godshall, slip op. at 9, 10, 12.

For lawyers on either side the better question is not simply when the patient first complained. It is when the complaint stopped looking like recovery and started looking like evidence of an injury caused by the care itself.

How Med Legal Pro helps

Accrual disputes are won in the records. Med Legal Pro builds the postoperative chronologies these cases turn on, isolating each reassurance, each therapy note, each objective finding, and the date the medicine first showed that prior care may have failed. Our nurse consultants and physician experts also address the medical question underneath the limitations fight: whether the alleged failure was latent, when it would have become detectable, and what a reasonable patient would have been told to expect.

Call 844-633-5345 or submit a case to discuss a matter with our team.

This article is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or medical advice. Case law and limitations statutes vary by jurisdiction and change over time. Verify current authority in your forum before relying on any decision discussed here.

About Tracy L. Liberatore Esq, PA-Emeritus