Must a Malpractice Plaintiff Prove the Patient Would Have Survived?

Tanya Smith was treated for breast cancer for about thirteen months. She went through chemotherapy and radiation, and the disease kept spreading. The problem was there from the start: the imaging never found a breast tumor, and two of the scans listed lymphoma as a possibility. When a later biopsy finally showed she had a rare and aggressive lymphoma, the best window for treating it had closed. She died in January 2019.

Her family sued the oncologist who treated her. Their theory was that the doctor saw findings that did not fit the diagnosis, never questioned them, and that the delay increased Smith’s risk of dying. The defense had an obvious answer. This was a cancer with a grim prognosis, and Smith lived about as long as the medical literature says patients with it usually do. Could anyone honestly say she would have survived with the right treatment?

On October 29, 2026, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said the family did not have to. In Estate of Smith v. Kannarkatt, No. 17 MAP 2025, the court applied Pennsylvania’s increased risk of harm standard and held that the plaintiffs’ expert evidence was enough to let a jury decide whether the oncologist’s conduct was a substantial factor in Smith’s harm and death. Slip op. at 19, 27.

The case is about cancer, but the question reaches every delayed diagnosis and failure to treat claim: how do you prove causation when the patient was already in danger before the doctor did anything wrong?

What happened to Tanya Smith

In March 2017, Smith was found to have an enlarged lymph node in her armpit while she was being treated for shoulder pain. A pathologist read the biopsy as metastatic adenocarcinoma “compatible with breast origin.” Over the next week she had a CT scan, PET scan, mammogram and ultrasound. None of them found a primary tumor or pointed to the breast, and the CT and PET reports both listed lymphoma in the differential. Id. at 2.

Her oncologist, Dr. Annie Kannarkatt, had all of those results. She treated Smith for breast cancer anyway, without going back to the pathologist. Id. at 3.

By November 2017 the cancer had spread significantly. It reached her abdomen, and her gallbladder was removed in March 2018. A biopsy of that tissue changed the diagnosis to ALK positive large B cell lymphoma. When the original March 2017 samples were re-examined, they matched. Smith had had lymphoma the whole time. She moved her care to Hershey Medical Center, received lymphoma chemotherapy, then salvage chemotherapy and a stem cell transplant. The cancer came back within about a month of the transplant, and she died on January 6, 2019. Id. at 3, 18 n.3.

How the case reached the Supreme Court

The first trial ended with a hung jury. At the second, the trial court granted a compulsory nonsuit when the plaintiffs rested, finding the causation evidence too thin. The Superior Court vacated that ruling and ordered a new trial, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 4, 5, 27.

The defense had support. The Pennsylvania Medical Society and the American Medical Association filed a joint amicus brief, and the Hospital and Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania filed one too. Id. at 19 n.4. A week after the decision, the Medical Society described the ruling as unfavorable to physicians (Nov. 4, 2026).

The rule: Hamil v. Bashline and increased risk of harm

To understand the outcome you have to go back to Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978). The court recognized there that ordinary causation rules break down when a doctor fails to protect a patient from a danger that already exists. If a patient had a real chance of dying no matter what, no expert can say with conventional certainty what proper care would have changed. Hold the plaintiff to that standard and the negligent doctor walks away every time.

So Hamil adopted Section 323(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Once a plaintiff shows that the defendant’s negligence increased the risk of the harm that actually occurred, the jury may go on to decide whether that increased risk was a substantial factor in causing it. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1286, 1288.

That does not take causation out of the case. The expert still has to give opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. What the expert does not have to do is say what would have happened. The expert has to say that the negligence increased the risk. After that, in the court’s words, “[t]he jury, not the medical expert, then has the duty to balance probabilities and decide whether defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” Gradel v. Inouye, 421 A.2d 674, 679 (Pa. 1980).

The Smith opinion also quotes the reasoning Hamil borrowed from the Fourth Circuit: “If there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable.” Slip op. at 23 (quoting Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966)).

Why the expert testimony was enough

The plaintiffs split the case between two experts, and that structure mattered.

Standard of care. Dr. Gerald Goldklang, a medical oncologist, testified that pathologists are not infallible and that an oncologist about to give a patient toxic chemotherapy has to be as close to certain of the diagnosis as possible. The pathology report said “compatible with,” not diagnostic. No primary tumor showed up, which he said is rare in this situation, and the scans raised lymphoma. In his view, a reasonable oncologist would have called pathology and asked for a deeper look. Id. at 11-13.

Causation. Dr. Robert Soiffer, an oncologist with expertise in lymphoma and bone marrow transplant, explained that untreated or poorly treated lymphoma grows, mutates and becomes resistant to chemotherapy. Transplants work best when the patient goes in early, with less disease. Smith’s disease progressed significantly during the thirteen months she was being treated for the wrong cancer, and she was weakened by chemotherapy that did nothing for her lymphoma. To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, he said the delay deprived her “of a substantially better opportunity for a longer life.” Id. at 13-17.

He also gave the defense plenty to work with on cross. He agreed the lymphoma was rare and aggressive, that he could not predict how long Smith would have lived, and that her survival was in line with published averages. Id. at 16, 17.

The defense built its appeal around those concessions. It argued the pathologist, not the oncologist, made the misdiagnosis. It argued there was no proof that a phone call to pathology would have changed anything. It said Dr. Soiffer’s opinion was about the delay in general rather than the oncologist’s specific failure, and that it rested on “magic words.” Id. at 19-22.

The court said most of that went to weight and credibility, not sufficiency. It agreed with the Superior Court that the testimony gave a jury a basis to find that Dr. Kannarkatt’s failure to question the diagnosis caused a significant delay that substantially reduced Smith’s chance of a better outcome. Whether her conduct was a substantial factor, alongside the pathologist’s error and the cancer itself, is for the jury. Id. at 22. The court added that it is “impossible to know what would have happened” if the oncologist had called the pathologist, and that this uncertainty is the reason the relaxed standard exists. Id. at 24.

The court did not decide liability. The jury does not have to believe the plaintiffs’ experts, and the defense can still attack the increased risk theory with its own experts and on cross examination. Id. at 24. In a footnote, the court also noted that any request to abrogate or modify Hamil was outside the question it agreed to hear, so a direct challenge to the doctrine is still possible in a future case. Id. at 23 n.6.

Where increased risk of harm stops: Montgomery

The standard does not save speculative expert testimony. In Montgomery v. South Philadelphia Medical Group, 656 A.2d 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), a patient complained of breast pain to a physician assistant for about a year without being referred to a physician. She was later diagnosed with Stage II breast cancer and had a mastectomy and chemotherapy. Her expert said the failure to refer fell below the standard of care, but would only say it was “very possible” the delay “may have increased” her risk, and he conceded that “one can only speculate” about the tumor’s size had it been found earlier. There was also no evidence that a physician would have found anything the PA missed. The nonsuit stood. 656 A.2d at 1392-93.

The Smith court distinguished Montgomery on the evidence, not on the outcome. Smith’s experts tied specific things together: a diagnosis that did not fit the clinical picture, a doctor who had the conflicting results and did not act on them, documented progression of the disease during the delay, and a medical explanation of why earlier proper treatment improves the odds of remission and a cure. The court also noted that the Montgomery patient recovered fully, while Smith’s cancer spread and killed her. Slip op. at 25-27.

Increased risk of harm is not the same as loss of chance everywhere

Lawyers often use “increased risk of harm” and “loss of chance” as if they were the same thing. They are not. Massachusetts recognizes loss of chance “not as a theory of causation, but as a theory of injury.” Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 1, 16, 890 N.E.2d 819 (2008). There, the lost chance of a better outcome is itself the compensable harm, which affects how damages are measured. Pennsylvania’s Hamil rule is a relaxed causation standard for the injury that actually occurred, here Smith’s progression and death. Other states take still other approaches, and some reject the doctrine. Before you plead it or defend against it, check how the governing jurisdiction handles both the burden and the damages.

What this means for plaintiff counsel

  • Build causation with the standard of care, not after it. Fix the date when the right workup or treatment should have happened, then compare the patient’s condition on that date with the condition later documented.
  • Use the record to show who knew what. In Smith, the key fact was that the oncologist had the CT, PET, mammogram and ultrasound results in hand. A chronology that shows exactly when each result reached each provider is what makes that argument.
  • Match the causation expert to the disease. The defense went after Dr. Soiffer because he had never treated this particular lymphoma. Your causation expert should know the actual disease and its treatment path, not just the specialty.
  • Connect the opinion to the specific breach. The defense argued the causation testimony addressed “the delay” generally rather than the oncologist’s failure to communicate. Make sure your expert links the particular omission to the increased risk.
  • Get the words and the substance. The expert does not need to say “increased the risk of harm,” but the opinion has to be given to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and has to explain the mechanism: progression, resistance, lost transplant window, toxicity from the wrong treatment.

What this means for defense counsel

  • Build the same chronology and test every link in it. If another provider made the original error, look closely at whether your client had an independent duty to question it and what the record shows that client actually had.
  • Do not count on a nonsuit. After Smith, a plaintiff’s expert who ties the delay to progression with reasonable certainty will usually get the case to a jury. Plan to win on the merits.
  • Bring your own causation expert. Hamil expressly allows defense testimony on how unlikely survival was even with proper care. Natural history of the disease, treatment limits and prognosis with timely care are all still jury questions.
  • Use the survival data on cross. Concessions about median survival and the limits of prediction did not win the appeal, but they are exactly what a jury weighs.

The bottom line

A patient with an aggressive disease may never have been guaranteed survival. That does not mean negligent care could not have made things worse. And proof that a diagnosis was late does not, on its own, prove the delay caused more harm. Smith asks attorneys on both sides to tell those situations apart.

The real question is not whether the patient would certainly have lived. It is whether the evidence lets a jury, under the law of the governing state, find that the defendant’s negligence contributed to the harm that occurred. That work belongs at case evaluation, well before expert disclosures and long before trial.

How Med Legal Pro helps

Delayed diagnosis cases usually need two different experts: one in the defendant’s specialty for the standard of care, and one who knows the disease well enough to explain causation and prognosis. We match both for plaintiff and defense attorneys in medical malpractice and wrongful death cases, and we organize the records into a chronology that shows who had which result and when.

To talk through a causation question or find the right expert, call 844-633-5345 or submit a case. We run a conflict check before any name is released. You can also browse our expert witness directory by specialty.

This article is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. The case discussed was remanded for a new trial, and no finding of liability has been made.

About Tracy L. Liberatore Esq, PA-Emeritus

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